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MR. KLOTZ: May it please the Court, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury. At the beginning of this case you heard opening
statements from Mr. Wilson and myself. My opening
statement to you was: `Thank God, opening statements
aren't evidence.'
There are many things that were said about what
was going to happen in this case which haven't
happened. We have to concentrate on what has
happened and what has been proven and this is what
we have to address ourselves. If there were some
things said about the defendant or anybody else in
opening statements, those are not before you,
they're not in evidence, they mean nothing. For
whatever reason, they were not proceeded upon.
This is not a case of Richard Dupont vs. the
District Attorney or John Klotz vs. Roy Cohn, and
ultimately it's not even a case of Roy Cohn vs.
Richard Dupont. Ultimately there's only one issue
or twelve issues in this case, that's Richard
Dupont and his responsibility as instructed by the
Court for the acts that remain in the indictment.
Twelve.
When this is all over, you're going to return to
your normal affairs, your normal business and the
District Attorney, the Judge and myself, we turn
to other cases or other endeavors. But only
Richard Dupont is going to be left with the re-
sults of your deliberations from now and for the
rest of his life and into eternity. And it is a
very special moment for him and for all of us in
another context.
Before we do anything else, I'd like to, if I can,
give the bare outlines of the matter before us
without any controversial, disputed things at all
so that we have a common context or frame of
reference of what we're talking about.
I don't think that it can be disputed that in
1976, Richard Dupont sought to establish a busi-
ness enterprise in 644 Greenwich Avenue, a build-
ing down in the Village, eventually called "Big
Gym" and that Dupont entered into a contract to
purchase the mortgage of the building. That con-
tract is in evidence.
Perhaps as a lawyer, I should do my best to ex-
plain what all this means. Again, the law basical-
ly comes from the judge. It's a very peripheral
issue, it really isn't an issue at all. When a
person has a mortgage on a building he has the
right to collect monies that are due under the
mortgage and then if the money is not paid, he
forecloses the mortgage and the property is of-
fered for public sale. People can come and bid. It
must be a public sale. It must be held, notices
must be published etc. The proceeds of the sale to
do not necessarily go to the mortgage holder. The
mortgage holder is only entitled to receive what
is due him on the mortgage and the rest of the
proceeds, in theory, are used to pay off other
creditors and if any money is left beyond that it
goes to the mortgagor, the person who borrowed the
money to begin with. That's the theory.
As a practical matter, in many cases, at the
public sale, the mortgage holder bids in the
amount of his mortgage. In other words, in this
case, the mortgage holder was owed three hundred
and fifty thousand or thereabouts, that's not
really a serious issue. The referee bangs his
gavel, sells the property. The mortgage holder
makes his bid. Therefore, if anybody wants else
wants to buy the property they have to bid more
than that.
What Dupont sought to buy in '76 (and it's pretty
clear what Zucker eventually bought in the latter
stages) was the right of the mortgage holder. In
other words, the right to go and bid the amount of
the mortgage and 90 per cent, 80 per cent, most of
the time, when you come to the sale, the mortgage
holder bids his lien, he buys the building. But
this first contract that Dupont entered into and
the one Zucker eventually - -Donald Zucker, I
don't have to explain who Donald Zucker is sup-
posed to be or is-- did buy, buy the right to
purchase the mortgage, buy the mortgagee's inter-
est which means purchase the building by bidding
the amount of the mortgage. Well, that's not an
uncommon thing.
I think it's also undisputed in 1977, Richard
didn't close the contract, didn't purchase the
mortgage interest for whatever reason that may be
in dispute. Richard did not close. He did not buy
the mortgage's interest, he did not obtain the
right to simply bid the mortgage interest and get
title to the property in that way.
In 1977 Richard met a young man, David Trapnell,
who testified-- I think it's pretty clear he met
David Trapnell in 1977. At some point in here it's
pretty clear that Donald Zucker had done what
Richard wanted to do, he bought the mortgagee's
interest and the right to bid it in. In December
of '77 there was a sale and Trapnell and Dupont
--basically Trapnell acting as Richard's partner,
bid, I think, $57,600 for the premises. Trapnell,
and again this can not be seriously disputed, the
evidence is here, Trapnell paid $57,600 to the
referee who was selling the property with an
obligation to close within so many days after that
to buy the property. And I think it's pretty
clear, can not be disputed, that Trapnell and
Dupont did not close that transaction either.
It's also pretty clear that through this period of
time various people were coming to see Big Gym and
Richard and Trapnell's enterprise at 644 Green-
wich. Gillis testified he came; Cohn and everybody
else testified that Lew Katz was there; Paul Dano
indicated he was there; David Tackett, another
prosecution witness, testified that he was there.
Everybody is looking and talking to Richard. And
that can't be disputed.
Ed Heller testified-- remember, he was the young
lawyer for Saxe Bacon & Bolan who quit in June,
1978? He left Saxe Bacon & Bolan sometime in June
of '78, that's pretty important in terms of set-
ting time frames. Heller testified that at some
time when he was working for Saxe Bacon & Bolan,
Roy Cohn said to him or sent him with Paul Dano to
see Zucker. Zucker already had title, apparently
before the second referee sale. Heller testified
he was sent with Dano to see Zucker and either
Zucker's partner or his lawyer to purchase the
building for Dano.
June of 1978, Zucker did what would be expected.
Holding the mortgagee's interest, having purchased
that, there was another sale of the building,
Zucker purchased it. By July '78 (notice I am
trying to concentrate in this particular run
through on those things which are not really in
dispute) Saxe, Bacon & Bolan is defending Dupont
Estates, Richard Dupont and Trapnell. Zucker, who
had purchased the property is seeking to oust
them.
Also, at this particular time, Russell Eldridge,
the hairdresser from Cherry Hill and other places,
begins to work at Big Gym, sets up the book keep-
ing, the record keeping system for Big Gym, starts
collecting money for Big Gym, starts writing out
the membership cards for Big Gym.
In September of '78 (I believe it's in evidence)
Mr. Cohn testified there was a complaint filed by
Saxe Bacon & Bolan suing on behalf of Richard
Dupont and Dupont Estates against Aaron Schwartz,
the receiver of the property, and Zucker. In
October of 1978, it's pretty undisputed that
Schwartz who was the receiver, now the receiver --
maybe I should explain this to you--
MR. WILSON: Judge, I'm going to object to Mr. Klotz if he's going
to explain what receivers in general are.
MR. KLOTZ: I think it's important that they understand.
THE COURT: No, if you want it, you make a request to the Court.
That's a legal matter and it's not in evidence. I'll
sustain the objection. I don't think attorney's should
have the right to expostulate on the law or give a
description of in the face of an objection. That's my
role if it's appropriate. Sustained.
MR. KLOTZ: (continuing) The receiver who had signed a lease with
Dupont renting him part of the premises sometime in '76
sued Dupont for rent due from November, December of
1977 which was the expiration of that lease. It was
also just before Dupont and Trapnell put down the
$57,000 to buy the property, that the lease expired.
Saxe Bacon & Bolan defended that.
Now the court, and this is in evidence, apparently
ordered the payment of use and occupancy.
Mr. Cohn testified about this, there's no dispute
about this. Use and occupancy is money paid by
someone who is occupying real property, defending
an eviction action, but the court said it's not
fair for you to be there if you are defending the
action without paying rent. The Court ordered ten
thousand dollars use and occupancy, the rent being
$1,400 per month and that's in evidence.
They ordered Dupont to post approximately seven
month's rent, due rent to stay there. And it's
undisputed that Saxe Bacon and Bolan paid that
money from Saxe Bacon & Bolan's law firm account.
That's not in dispute and that occurred in Octob-
er, 1978.
Not disputed is that in November of 1978, the
referee said to Dupont -- referee made a decision
(this is referee Donald Diamond of the Supreme
Court) said you have no right to stay there, you
should get out. It's undisputed, December 12, 1978
or 11th, that particular one or two day period, an
order was entered by a Supreme Court judge, "Yes,
Donald Diamond, we adopt his report and get out."
In 1978, Saxe Bacon & Bolan did nothing between
December 12 and January-- between December 12,
1978 and January 9th, 1979, no formal steps were
taken to defend Richard's right to be there or to
even delay it a few days so Richard had time to
get his stuff together and move out. Nothing was
done until after the trucks were lined up in front
of Big Gym to remove everything. The application
for an order to show cause, in evidence from the
court files was not submitted until January 9th.
Richard testified sometime in the afternoon. No
contrary testimony to that.
Not disputed either, there is in evidence a com-
plaint dated February 20, 1979 where the name of
the attorney appears. It's also not disputed that
particular complaint was an action Dupont v.
Zucker and was verified by Richard on February 27,
1978. That's not disputed, it's in evidence. I
don't believe it could be disputed, it's in evi-
dence, you saw it. Saxe Bacon & Bolan, February
27th.
It's also not disputed, the versions are disputed,
that sometime on April of '79 --we're in '79 now--
Dupont visited Cohn in the hospital. I mean, boy,
we've talked about that hospital visit. Not dis-
puted, can't be. Well, it's in evidence, a piece
of paper, it's nobody's testimony, that on May
23d, 1979 in an action Dupont v. Zucker, Dupont
verified an affidavit for Saxe Bacon & Bolan. So
in that action which was an action suing Zucker
for over a million dollars, May 23, 1979, Saxe
Bacon & Bolan papers, Richard verifies an affida-
vit. That affidavit, incidentally, was in connec-
tion (you can read it) with various motions.
Richard testified that sometime in June '79
--there's no testimony to the contrary-- he testi-
fied at a deposition. It's also not disputed that
on June 22, 1979 and when it was finally admitted
into evidence we did not object, June 22, 1979,
Dupont sent a telegram concerning the French desk,
the cartoons and all that stuff. Richard sent that
telegram, we're not disputing that.
Also not disputed is that in the Fall of '79,
David Tackett visited Roy Cohn to talk about
Richard. This run through, let's just leave it at
that. That's undisputed. Dupont testified to it.
Cohn testified to it. Tackett testified to it.
In the meantime, there are two other sagas that
are touched upon by this case that are taking
place. In the later part of '78, early part of
'79, Steve Rubell and Ian Schraeger -- this is
part of the case, certainly part of the later
counts-- are arrested and charged with evading
many hundreds of thousands of dollars in income
taxes. Mr. Cohn testified that he had been Ru-
bell's and Schraeger's lawyer from the inception
of Studio 54.
Also it is in this case as a peripheral matter, a
collateral matter we sometimes call them, that a
fellow called Eugene Skowron and a business asso-
ciate named Howard Pfeffer had gone to Cohn.
Skowron had been accused of a crime. He also had a
business called Universal Money Order which was a
check cashing business. Somehow, Skowron wound up
in jail (which Mr. Pfeffer indicated was a sur-
prise) and Paul Dano ended up buying Mr. Skowron's
business with what Mr. Pfeffer (a prosecution
witness said) was at least, in part, Mr. Pfeffer's
money.
All that is really prologue. With the exception of
perhaps the First Count, it's the background. It's
the milieu in which everything has to be evaluat-
ed. Essentially, it's uncontroverted. And from
this, there is now before you some action which
occurred, with the exception to Count One, after
all of this. There is before you a twelve count
indictment charging Richard with various crimes.
Now, Count One (I'm just going to run through them
quickly the first time) Count One charges attempt-
ed coercion saying that in February of 1979, Saxe
terminated its legal representation of Richard
Dupont and thereafter Richard tried to coerce Roy
Cohn into being his lawyer by threatening damage
to the property of Saxe, Bacon & Bolan. That's
Count One.
Count Two charges that Richard committed burglary,
Third Degree, by entering the offices of Mr.
Gillis without permission with intent to commit
the crime of larceny.
Count Three charges Richard stole papers from the
of fice.
Count Four charges that Richard attempted to steal
money from Saxe, Bacon & Bolan by billing phone
calls.
I'm giving shorthand for all this, the indictment
governs.
Count Five charges that Richard harassed someone
named June Osbourne, an employee at Manufacturers
Hanover bank by phoning her and telling her infor-
mation concerning Saxe, Bacon and Bolan or Dano or
somebody was kiting checks. Richard, by the way
has not denied that phone call.
Six, he's charged with harassing Ellen McGrath.
Cer tainly Richard has conceded he's called Ellen
McGrath on many occasions and the contents of the
calls.
He's charged with harassment by calling the Green-
wich police in Count Seven which was related to
Count Ten, based on the same facts, charged essen-
tially turning in a false alarm. Seven and Ten are
the same factual pattern.
Count Eight, he's charged with initiating and
communicating with Roy Cohn through something
called Now East which you all had a chance to read
or see anyway.
Count Nine, he's charged with putting a public
notice in the New York Times.
Ten, I spoke about.
Eleven he's charged with knowing that Howard
Pfeffer was going to testify before a Grand Jury
trying to prevent him from talking or tampering
with him.
Twelve he's charged with harassing Roy Cohn
through all of the above, essentially.
Now Dupont is on trial for the allegations of that
indictment. He's not on trial for having once
been convicted, over ten years ago, of a crime.
That's not an issue, that only will come in terms
of whether or not his testimony credible. Once
convicted ten years ago he's not on trial for
that.
He's not on trial because at various times during
the course of salesmanship or whatever, he doesn't
use his name. That doesn't lie at the heart of
any charges. He's not on trial for that. He's
not on trial because at one time he may have used
what you or I would consider questionable business
practices. That's not any charge before us. If
you feel that's a charge before us, that's someth-
ing you've got to take out. None of them are a
part of any charge.
And these things which consume a substantial
portion or at least a large portion of Mr. Wil-
son's examination of Mr. Dupont do not relate to
the specific question of did he do this and the
fact that you may not like Richard, the fact you
may have thought he was a terrible witness, the
fact that anyone else here may agree with you does
not affect the point of did he do that. They just
go to if you believe what he said, maybe. The
judge is going to instruct you on what you can
consider in considering credibility.
Now, as I said, he can't be convicted because you
may not, for certain reasons, decide you don't
like him very much. Okay? We're talking about
conviction for a crime, and we convict people for
what they do, not for how we feel about them.
And the fact that he may be unpopular does not
mean he's guilty.
The fact you may even be repulsed by some of the
things he says or does not mean he's guilty of the
charges in that indictment.
And before I get carried away with this, remember
Richard did not have to take the stand, that was a
voluntary act. His right not to take the stand is
enshrined in the Constitution of the United
States, but he put that right aside, and he took
the stand. He was testifying with his life and
his freedom on the line and what one or any of us
in this room unless they've had a lot of experi-
ence in the courtroom would not understand those
circumstances, tend to be overwrought. Who could
sit there with all of these charges against us
having watched witness after witness appear, not
to be a little nervous, so over anxious, so over-
wrought, to make a point that perhaps you make a
bad impression. Richard was reliving a nightmare
on the stand.
In the course of his representation by Saxe, Bacon
and Bolan, to him, he not only lost his business,
he not only lost his potential business if he had
one, he lost his home. He was arrested at one
point for having gone back to his home after he
was evicted from it and it's in the record that
his lawyers were Saxe at that time.
He had the traumatic experience and I really don't
think this can be disputed, that on January 9th,
of 1979 (and whether you or I may think this
business of Big Gym was the greatest enterprise of
all time is irrelevant, but to him I think he was
sincere in saying it was) he walks in. January of
1979 and suddenly the Sheriff is in there with the
movers and his property is being carted away.
That's a painful experience, one that would af-
fect, I think, how he sits on the stand. And he
took that stand of his own volition knowing, his
he a admitted, all those things which could be
brought up by the prosecutor and all of his past
practices, everything in his life, would be sub-
jected to the closest scrutiny and the most
searching examination by Mr. Wilson as is his
duty. I'm not gainsaying Mr. Wilson's right to
subject Richard to a grueling examination. But
certainly Mr. Wilson, being Bureau Chief or wha-
tever,was a relentless and persistent interroga-
tor.
And how many of us in this room would really feel
comfortable under those circumstances? And how
many of us would be able to maintain our cool and
testify in an unconcerned way. Yet, testify he
did.
Contrast it with Roy Cohn. If the question was
who presents a better public image, Roy Cohn or
Richard Dupont, lets stop right now. But again,
that's not the question before you. What a mag-
nificent image was proffered of Roy Cohn by the
District Attorney's office. Make no mistake about
it, when you put a witness on the stand, you vouch
for him. Chairman of the Board, in a sense, the
senior partner, of this magnificent law firm Saxe,
Bacon & Bolan. You get the impression of Cohn
sitting in a chair someplace, it's almost bibli-
cal. I send this man thither and he goes, I send
this man yonder and he goes, people report -- too
busy to pay attention to the trifling affairs of
Richard Dupont. Why should the senior partner of
this law firm care too much about this man? This
crazy man, this creep.
"Creep". (That's his word,) who I never really
trusted from the very beginning." "I really never
paid attention to this." How many times did Roy
Cohn say when you got beyond the first fringe of
his examination "I really don't remember that," "I
really don't recall that?" Hundreds of times,
tens of times. You're recollection governs. I
recall an awful lot.
I'm going to suggest something to you. That if
you do your job, put aside your initial impres-
sions and you carefully evaluate the evidence. In
deliberation, you're going to find not only at the
very minimum reasonable doubt about the particu-
lars of this case if we counted by count, but I
think you are going to reach the surprising con-
clusion that when it comes to he guts of this case
you have more reason to believe Mr. Dupont that
you have of Roy Cohn. And the burden of proof is
on the prosecution.
We don't -- the defense does not have to prove
anything. It's the burden of proof of the prose-
cution to remove from your minds reasonable
doubt.
Now, the judge will instruct you in detail on he
law, your recollection of the evidence will gov-
ern. And this is going to be a relatively long
presentation this morning, but this is my chance,
this is the defendant's opportunity to go over
with you this evidence. Mr. Wilson will come
after.
First, let's do a quick run through on the various
personalities who marched to the stand.
Roy Cohn, first witness, testified at length,
Chairman of the Board on direct examination,
senior partner --" I let the little guys in the
office handle the stuff and I met with Richard
Dupont" -- how many times did Roy cohn meet
Richard Dupont? Various times in his testimony, I
think two or three times, I think that's what I
recall, certainly didn't say five or six.
Robert Treadway; nice young man. Had a story on
the direct examination which was awesome in it's
detail. On Cross Examination unfortunately, a lot
of that detail seemed to vanish. Do you remember
the number of visits it took to get files and all
of a sudden on Cross Examination it wasn't quite
as many visits. Do you remember his detailed
description of thumbing through the file and
summarizing the material. This is key, we'll get
back to this, two sheets of original letterhead
paper in the same style of Saxe, Bacon & Bolan to
which was annexed a piece of paper, Freedman-Roth
was on that piece of paper. They were stapled
together and they were in the file for 39 East
68th Street which by this time we know was Roy
Cohn's townhouse, office or whatever.
Edward Gillis: (Roy Cohn testified on Direct
Examina tion that he didn't know Gillis well, that
he was not a very close friend;) testified as to
what was in the files. Between him and Treadway,
we'll discuss later. Gillis I think made a nice
impression. Also seemed to know Roy Cohn a lot
better than Roy Cohn said Gillis knew him. Gillis
testified that when he went on vacation last
December he had the freedom to hook up his answer-
ing service or phone to Saxe Bacon & Bolan's
switchboard. Manso told us how Gillis spends
holidays with Roy in Provincetown and various
places and Manso met him there the last three
years. Gillis testified that he reported about his
activities at 644 Greenwich Street directly to Roy
Cohn.
David Tackett -- by the way the piece of paper in
that file will demonstrate that.
David Tackett; nice appearing young man. Known
Mr. Cohn when he met him in a night club in Miami.
Six months later he moved to New York in this
powerhouse of a business with Paul Dano. Had seen
Richard's business early on, had reported directly
to Roy Cohn what a crazy business it was - - early
on.
Ellen McGrath -- Now Ellen McGrath is one of the
people who Richard is accused of harassing on the
telephone. What the indictment does, it picks up
one or two or some number from scores of phone
calls that Ellen McGrath has had with Richard both
before and after the incident and said that was an
harassing phone call. I must say this and this is
probably the most discouraging part of Richard's
examination and the reaction that people had when
he was on the stand, in his excitement and real
sense of outrage, his inability to communicate
that well. People like Richard.
Ellen McGrath, during my Cross Examination and I
think it was sincere, I don't think Ellen McGrath
dislikes Richard Dupont at all. I think she
almost views him with -- you know, affection
friendship. And you may remember my last ques-
tion, Richard's last phone call to Ellen, highly
harassing. After harassing phone calls were
alleged, Ellen testified to phone calls by Richard
which were not harassing.
June Osbourne, she was the woman from Manufactur-
ers bank. She has a job to receive complaints, she
got one, she passed it on, that's her job. Dupont
admits that call.
Howard Pfeffer, Catskill comic, spent several
years in the Borscht Belt, comedian, don't forget
about that. We'll talk more in detail about him
later on. I don't get the impression Howard
Pfeffer dislikes Richard.
Mrs. Engle for the telephone company was just a
technical witness, got a lot of documents intro-
duced. She didn't have anything terribly direct
to say except she testified to some telephone
company procedures and we got some records in
evidence.
Miss Mayo, for the answering service, there's no
con tention that Richard ever spoke to Miss Mayo.
Okay? I don't think there can be -- she was admit-
ted for very limited purposes, we'll have to
figure out later.
Mrs. Pelletier for the New York Times took an ad
for one of the advertisements and I get the im-
pression that outside of the connection of that ad
in the New York Times, you know the one that Roy
Cohn and Paul Dano and Lew Katz are taking over
Studio 54, that the principal reason for saying
Richard must have talked to Mrs. Pelletier on the
telephone was that the man was polite and nice.
If he's convicted on that charge of harassment,
he'll be the first person convicted of harassment
for having talked nice to someone on the tele-
phone, if he did it, which he denied. That's the
only connection of the voice that they'll tell you
about. She never identified his voice, she never
heard Richard speak.
Mr. Brody, the same thing. Mr. Brody who was an
assistant to Judge Kirschenbaum. No identification
of the voice. In Brody's case, the person who
called him did leave back a number. There was no
call back on that number to see who was on the
other side of that. You're going to be instructed
on circumstantial evidence as to Pelletier and
Brody.
Manso testified that he called Now East, that he
also received a copy of Now East from an employee
of Roy Cohn's. Pretty important. Received a copy
of Now East from an employee of Roy Cohn. He had
expressed an interest to the employee of Roy Cohn
an getting more copies and he also called Now
East and thereafter he received a call from a
voice who he cannot identify who said his name
was Richard Colt Dupont. No other place in this
record is there any allegation or Richard ever
using three names on a phone call.
Now, witnesses for the defense -- I think that's
all of the prosecutions witnesses, if I overlooked
somebody -- witnesses for the defense, David
Trapnell. David, despite the best efforts of Mr.
Wilson, does not feel cheated, - - I think that's
pretty obvious -- by Richard. He's Richard's
partner, came back here from Los Angeles to testi-
fy. He did pay fifty-seven thousand for the right
to purchase at the sale and he testified as to
certain events that Richard testified deeply to.
Edward Heller, the young lawyer from Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan, never a question asked of Mr. Heller on
Cross Examination. Testified simply and directly
to a snapshot. Your problem is to find out the
truly, what really happened. Ed Heller is a
snapshot. I think it's a very reliable snapshot.
It's a little picture that's beyond attack and how
does it fit in? Before June of 1978 or sometime
in June of 1978 at the very latest. Roy Cohn sent
Ed Heller with Paul Dano to buy the building from
Zucker. Okay? How does that fit into the picture
painted by Roy Cohn and Richard Dupont? Where
does that fit in to this case?
Ed Molin, Mr. Wilson did spend some time cross
examining Mr. Molin, not very much. His testimony
was another snapshot. Ed Molin's snapshot was
January 1st, he testified, 1979, we are in that
period of time between the court telling -- the
judge and the court saying the referee is right,
get out and January 9 when the trucks arrived
unexpectedly. Ed Molin says I met Richard for the
holidays, we were at Trilogy Restaurant, Richard
had some conversations, I didn't hear those. Molin
did not come in and say I heard this, this and
this, a million things.
Molin testified to a very limited snapshot. Roy
Cohn came over to their table. The conversation
was about how the buttons fit on the fur coat.
Roy mentioned the fur coat was fine but had to do
something with the buttons and Richard asked him
to come see the Big Gym. Cohn said when I argue
for you in court I want to be able to tell the
judge I've never been there, I don't want to be a
witness. Believable statements. May sound
strange to someone who is not a lawyer. State-
ments, if you believe Roy Cohn, never happened.
Patricia Livermore, another snapshot. Again
another person no questions asked on Cross Exami-
nation. Again limited believable testimony from a
real person with no real demonstrable interest in
this litigation. She testified about how late it
was when Richard left a dinner party she was
having. She was at some dinner in a restaurant,
he left very late to go to Roy Cohn's birthday
party. Somehow Richard's appearance at Roy Cohn's
birthday party is a capital offense. However, it
was late in the night.
Livermore's testimony was on that point. She
also remembered another incident the year before,
1979, the Spring of 1979. It's very hard for me
to tell about what would impress a jury the most
about people telling the truth or not. Personally
-- strike personally. You have to look at this,
take Treadway, remember Treadway's impressive
testimony when he was up there. You ask one
question and Treadway tells you everything but the
color of Dupont's socks. He knows the color of
the papers in the files. He knows precisely where
he was. He's running back and forth. Well, all
that stuff he knew, which on cross examination he
had to retract part of.
Livermore, testified -- she doesn't tell you it
was a quarter to seven on May 13th and, it was
this and that. She said sometime in the Spring
Richard stopped by, it was after dinner, he had to
go over to the townhouse -- she testified she's
known Roy Cohn ten or twelve years." And I had to
walk my dog, I walked my dog over at the townhouse
with Richard and I sat with Richard while he's
waiting to see Roy Cohn for an appointment and I'm
there until Roy Cohn is ready to see Richard.
Snapshot. Couldn't have been too late in the
Spring, couldn't come in too early because it was
light when they left the house, around 6:30, 7:00.
A little snapshot, but a snapshot which is totally
inconsistent with the story that Dupont was fired
by Cohn in January of 1979. Snapshot, but a
witness you'll have to totally disregard and throw
in a trash can to convict. Count Number One,
totally impeached.
The defense called Russell Eldridge to the stand,
re member that. Cohn testified as to Russell
Eldridge's involvement and Russell doing this and
Russell doing that. It wasn't the prosecution
calling Russell Eldridge to the stand, it was the
defense.
Paul Dano, the defense called Paul Dano to the
stand. We elicited from Paul Dano one thing, yes,
Ed Heller did take him to see Zucker. He did
testify to that. We asked Mr. Dano when he ac-
quired Richard's Rolls Royce, he testified late in
seventy-eight. We pointed out that he had pre-
viously sworn -- got it August of seventy-eight,
that's a big difference there because of the facts
of the case.
Now the testimony of August of 1978, the judge
will instruct you is for a limited purpose. As I
said before, vouching for a witness, we call Dano,
I mean here I am -- here Richard is -- the defense
is calling to the stand what would be reasonably
classified on the evidence before us, Roy Cohn's
most intimate associate, a person very close to
Roy Cohn, business wise, every other wise. The
defense calls him to the stand. We asked very few
questions. Once the inconsistency between the
prior testimony arose, we had no further questions
for Mr. Dano.
Vincent Millard testified -- well, not too very
much because the issue was the existence of cer-
tain books and records. And as the trial moved on
and particularly with Miss Livermore's testimony
we did not feel it necessary to pursue Millard any
further.
And, of course, Richard Dupont testified. And we
do have in terms of credibility some dispute
between Richard and Roy Cohn, let's face it. And
on the surface, again, looking at appearances, one
would want to say well, there's that lawyer up
there and this person whose pictures are on covers
of magazines, all over the place, very famous
person, Studio 54. Here's this crazy fag from the
Village yelling and screaming at me. Who should I
believe?
I'm going to challenge you. I'm going to ask you
to suspend in your determinations for at least a
few minutes or so during your deliberations. Don't
make a facile determination of credibility of
those two. Don't just say I'm going to believe
Cohn because he was obviously a very important
person, Dupont's a crazy person. Suspend it for a
minute. Examine the pieces of paper if necessary
or recall the pieces of paper. Recall the testi-
mony of everybody else and compare it with what
Cohn said and with what Dupont said. And if you
do, maybe you won't determine that I'm going to
believe everything that Richard said, but you
certainly ought to have a reasonable doubt about
the tale told by Roy Cohn and about Roy Cohn's
testimony.
Cohn's testimony, '76, '79 -- '78 Cohn testifies
that Dupont originally never paid a dime of that
rent. Dupont never paid anything to buy the
building and Dupont told him that he had given
Zucker seventy-five thousand dollars. Well,
that's bunk.
We know they paid money to buy the building, we
have a piece of paper which says that they did.
The rental actions were brought against Richard
and there was money paid on those leases, there
was evidence that there was money paid on that
lease from '76 to November of '77, no contradic-
tion of that by people who know the facts.
Now Cohn says that Richard approached him early
'78 and you remember, trying to pin Roy Cohn down
and God knows he's a successful attorney and
probably a lot smarter than any lawyer Richard
could afford or induce to represent him, trying to
pin Roy Cohn down to the date of the conversation
is one of the most interesting problems of juris-
prudence. He says he met Dupont personally early
in seventy-eight. Well, was it June of seventy-
eight? No, well, it was early in seventy-eight.
Was it January, Mr. Cohn? I'm not sure whether it
was that early. Well, January -- long time
between January and June of a year. Finally, I
think he decided it was March or April. We know,
don't we, that he sent Ed Heller and Mr. Dano to
Zucker to buy the building before June. Doesn't
recollect much else. He also said that other
lawyers were handling this," I didn't pay much
attention to it."
"Dano's the one that told me to pay the money" and
David Trapnell had some long testimony about that
meeting. "After the attorneys for Zucker told me
what a liar Dupont was, my goodness, was I
shocked, I decided enough was enough and some
other things happened." And that conversation
with the lawyers for Zucker we were successful in
pinning him down a little bit. Conversations
between Cohn and Zucker's attorney had to have
occurred before January 9 of 1979. "When I first
learned that Richard was such a horrible person."
In his testimony about Zucker. "I never met
Zucker in my life, I've never seen him, I don't
know who he is." Later on; "I've never met or
talked to Zucker to this very day." Later on;
"I've never spoken to Zucker directly or indirect-
ly." And let me, in your minds and in your mind
underline, emphasis supplied, indirectly and
that's what he testified to. Your recollection
governs, Okay? But that appears what he testified
to.
And he did not recall a conversation with Heller
about Zucker, but he did say well, it could be
that Heller had said let me talk to Zucker to
compromise this thing and I said yes. But of
course we know when Heller took Dano to see Zucker
there wasn't anything to compromise because it was
before June of '78. It was before Zucker brought
any lawsuits against Richard. It was before
anybody was seeking to evict Richard.
Now then, part of Cohn's testimony was this tape
re corded conversation between Cohn and Richard.
Remember? Not the first words, but words. "Isn't
it true that when you first came to me you told me
you had paid Zucker seventy-five thousand to buy
the building and he bought the building in his own
name?" Okay. Zucker did not buy the building in
his own name until June of 1978 at the second
referee's sale. And these papers are in evidence
I believe, or at least the testimony on them is in
evidence.
Let me skip forward and back as I did with Mr.
Cohn's Cross Examination. I showed Mr. Cohn -- I
said was this representation about seventy-five
thousand dollars being paid to Zucker important in
Richard's case? And he says: "yes, it was.
Richard told us he paid to Zucker seventy-five
thousand dollars and that was the whole case --
that was an important part of our case." I think
it is a fair summary of what was said.
I gave Mr. Cohn the complaint in the action, the
Dupont vs. Schwartz and Zucker, September of '78.
Where is it? And he looked at it. He said well,
"here it is but it's not $75,000, it's $57,000."
Remember that?
Except that the $57,000 was referring to the money
that David Trapnell actually did in fact pay,
there's no dispute about that Mr. Trapnell paying.
Then I said "where else, it's not here, where
else?" He said well, we filed an affirmative
defense to Zucker trying to get us out of the
building.
Now, that's July of '78, I believe that's also
been marked in evidence and we read that to the
Court, we read that to you, Richard identified his
signature on that. We read that to you an no
where was there any reference to $75,000. Again
it was a reference to the $57,000 that was actual-
ly paid.
Well, what's going on? Here is Roy Cohn, the
presti gious attorney telling us Richard Dupont
told me he paid $75,000 to Donald Zucker and that
was the basis of our case. This is a fact we put
in legal papers and when you go to legal papers
it's not there. The only reference is to the
Trapnell $57,000 paid to Zucker. What's going
on?
"Never paid a dime's rent for two years." That
was his testimony to the Grand Jury and that was
his testimony to you and the papers don't support
that. He didn't pay rent when Zucker -- No, he
didn't pay rent for the time he testified that
Trapnell made the bid, that was December of 1977
or nine months when Dupont consulted with Cohn.
Not for two years, never paid a dime's rent, never
paid a penny for the building.
Cohn testified he never paid a penny of the build-
ing. We know that's wrong, that's just not true.
Oh, I'm also into why did Cohn decide in February,
right, to fire Richard? Well, he discovered about
the Attorney General's problem. Well, we know at
least in October of '78 they were representing
Richard in front of the Attorney General.
And Richard was a terrible person who used other
names. Didn't Mr. Gillis by the way, testify that
when he first saw the building very early in the
game, that Richard used another name. I don't
really think any of that stuff came as a surprise
to Mr. Cohn.
Oh, yes, and also no one in the law firm agreed to
work with Richard. And this terminator of counsel
again we have a problem with Mr. Cohn. It's also
the same problem, not a mirror image, the same
problem. When did the conversation take place?
When Mr. Cohn is thinking about oh, gee whiz, I
testified that I spoke to Zucker's attorney before
Richard was evicted, you can see the date creeping
backward towards January of 1979. When you ask
him what was still going on in the file, Mr. Cohn
is becoming a little concerned, does he remember
everything in the file? The date kind of swings
forward towards April.
We know it was obviously before January and before
Dupont saw Mr. Cohn in the hospital. Cohn testi-
fied at the time Richard visited him in the hospi-
tal, we'll get into this in a little more detail,
I'm running very late, Dupont was already "dis-
traught." Mr. Dupont denied Roy Cohn had a conver-
sation with him in February terminating that
relationship. That these things that happened
thereafter; the hospital visit, Livermore's con-
versation, the papers filed by Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan, the appearance at the deposition are not
peripheral things but are very important.
Now Dupont's testimony. Dupont knew Cohn before.
That's Richard's testimony. He gave Cohn gifts: a
TV. set which Cohn did not mention in his testimo-
ny; a fur coat which Cohn explicitly denied in the
testimony but which Molin thinks was the subject
of the conversation in the Trilogy Restaurant; and
a desk which Cohn admitted but was a lousy desk
which we then spent money refurbishing.
And the flowers were wilted. Why did the flowers
have to be wilted at the hospital? You heard
Tackett testify, the nice gifts Richard had given
to people. Why did the antique desk have to be
terrible? The flowers have to be wilted? I would
suggest to you -- why is the fur coat denied? Why
is it denied? Flatly denied. Not that I don't
recall, but flatly denied. It might be something
going on here psychological. The testimony about
the wilted flowers which I don't believe is be-
lievable, the insistence that the flowers were
wilted, something to think about.
Let's go over Richard Dupont's testimony. Richard
testified that he had a contract with Ochs to buy
the building in 1976. Contract was not ful-
filled. He had a contract with David Trapnell to
buy the building, the contract is in evidence.
Unquestionably money paid on that contract and
Richard testified to money on the other. He
testified as to Russell, the hairdresser. Okay?
Russell, the hairdresser was put there to oversee
things for Roy Cohn. Russell was there collecting
the money; Russell was writing on the cards with
his own handwriting.
Cohn testified that Russell is Paul Dano's repre-
sentative. But he' somebody's representative at
Big Gym and Russell was there doing a lot of
things.
All right, let's get down to the nitty gritty.
Here's a flat out contradiction between testimony.
Cohn denied that Russell Eldridge had stayed
overnight in the townhouse on a regular basis
during '78, during the period in question and Cohn
testified under oath that Russell only stayed in
the townhouse in '79 when he was between engage-
ments, on his way from Big Gym to Chicago.
Who was it? Question: Who was it that testified
-- besides David Trapnell, who was it that testi-
fied that Russell Eldridge lived a third of the
time during this period of time and on a regular
basis slept overnight at the townhouse? Who was it
that told you that story? Do you remember?
I'll give you the answer, you can't answer me
back. Russell Eldridge. Russell Eldridge contra-
dicted Roy Cohn's testimony about his relation-
ships to Cohn and living at the town house.
Interesting. And to reinforce Dupont and Trapnell
to those particular items. Reasonable doubt.
Okay, the $10,000 contract, big dispute. Cohn
would have you believe that as an afterthought he
paid -- Paul Dano says, oh, heck, why don't you
give him the $10,000 and they took their money out
of their account, what the hell is -- excuse me --
what the heck is another $10,000, and we knew Paul
was good of it and that was all there was to that.
Was there a contract? Well maybe Russell was
supposed to do something because he was working so
hard, but I really don't remember anything like
that.
Trapnell testified, Dupont testified, Roy Cohn --
by the way, Gillis testified as to the facts -- to
the fact of the meeting, Roy Cohn -- no, Gillis
testified to the facts of the meeting; Eldridge
testified to the facts of the meeting; Trapnell
testified to the facts of the meeting; Dupont
testified to the facts of the meeting. A big
meeting with Roy Cohn which the payment of use and
occupancy was discussed. And Richard had said
consistently from there on and there is no ifs
ands or buts that since that time Richard has told
everybody "Roy Cohn is my partner." And when after
they severed relationships, -- Richard told every-
body Roy Cohn was my partner. And low and behold,
and that Roy Cohn has said Russell and I got 55 or
50% of this at that meeting. We're going to pay
the $10,000.
Here it is, Exhibit D in evidence, a contract
where Russell Eldridge picks up 45% of Big Gym or
Dupont Estates, Russell Eldridge, 45% for ten
thousand dollars.
Ed Gillis, I heard about this but I don't under-
stand it. I think that was Gillis's testimony,
gets ten percent of the business. This was the
same business for which the $57,000 was paid, lost
but paid. Thousands of dollars were paid for
rent, thousands of dollars were paid for heat and
utilities and these guys are picking over half of
it up for ten grand for use and occupancy. This
is it, prepared by Mike Cacase at Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan. Cohn identified Cacase for us.
Now, key point. The contract called for two
$5,000 payments. Not a single ten thousand dollar
payment, but two five thousand dollar payments and
there is no explanation in this record for the
manner of the payments except that contract be-
cause when the payments were made on use and
occupancy and these are in evidence, it was paid
by two $5,000 checks. You can scratch your head,
you can think about the evidence in the case. Is
there any explanation why they wrote two five
thousand dollar checks which had to do with that
contract which they prepared and which they gave
to Richard to sign?
Richard testified that in November, Diamond or-
dered them out. And he testified to the meeting
with Roy Cohn and he testified Roy Cohn held up a
magazine with a picture on the cover and said I'm
not worried about it. Look at this, guy, Decem-
ber issue of Esquire, I got a cover story, "Don't
Mess With Roy Cohn, the legal executioner.
In October of '79 Richard places the meeting with
an advanced copy that was out early and he showed
that to him and the context of do you think I'm
worried about Donald Zucker?
On December 12th, order of eviction; 11th, 12th,
order of eviction came down. What do they do?
Nothing. Richard runs down and says he's signing
all kinds of papers and you can believe it, boy.
He's got this business, got eight floors, seven
floors, six whatever it is, loaded down with, what
everyday says is junk except Richard and Trapnell.
He bought out the Claridge Hotel. He so testi-
fied.
What should I do? Doesn't do anything to move.
He says Cohn said sit tight, don't worry, we're on
this. We'll get an order to show cause. January
1st, Richard says he signed papers nothing hap-
pened yet.
And the kind of legal work we're talking about is
a law firm which has it's client, take from its
client at his request or not, sign blank pieces of
paper and these are in evidence. Obviously so
that some kind of legal documents can be filled
in, because we haven't got time to do the job
now. We'll do it later. And those pieces of
paper from Saxe, Bacon & Bolan's file in evi-
dence.
January 1st or thereabouts, Christmas season.
Richard meets his good friend Ed Molin at the
Trilogy Restaurant. Cohn is there with his bud-
dies.
Maybe Richard knew Cohn was going to be there, I
wouldn't put it past him. Walks in with Ed Molin,
it's kind of an annual affair for them to meet
once or twice for dinner, they're old friends.
They sit down, Richard sends over a bottle of
wine. Cohn stops by the table and has a conversa-
tion. And you know there's one thing about Cohn,
the minute a third party appears on the scene, his
conversations become much less descriptive. His
conversations with Richard are always very de-
tailed because it's my word against his and the
minute a third party pokes his nose around, things
are vague, things are less certain which is the
same thing at the sentencing of Rubell and
Schraeger.
We know this and it is not controverted that
between December 12th and -- of 1978 and January 9
of 1979 Saxe, Bacon & Bolan took no steps to keep
Richard in, or to delay for one minute his evic-
tion. Richard testified to no advice to move out.
Cohn said he wasn't involved. No one came from
Saxe, Bacon & Bolan. But we do know the first
time they went to court to get the order to show
cause was after the sheriff was there moving
Richard's goods out and the order to show cause
was simply rejected by the clerk and that's a
piece of paper that's in evidence -- deemed in
evidence. Okay. And we also know, by the way,
that before January 9 Roy Cohn admits speaking to
the attorneys for Zucker.
Now, what happened? What is this context really
about? I don't think one of Cohn's associates
ever really took Richard Dupont seriously as a
captain of industry.
Gillis testified he went and looked and reported
what he found. Tackett said he went and looked
and did it and reported what he found. Dano went
and looked and didn't like what he saw and didn't
invest.
Big Gym had an asset. Do you know what that asset
was? Richard Dupont's tenacity being in that
building and screwing up the efforts to convert
that building to residential property. Gillis
testified, Gillis testified that a property is
obviously, when you're doing a conversion, more
valuable vacant than full.
Gillis further testified, you know, a little
conflict -- Gillis testified that in the summer,
June of seventy-eight, Gillis testified in June of
seventy- eight when Zucker used his mortgage right
to buy the building, that June of seventy-eight
Zucker put the building up for sale but everybody
knew he was kidding. Remember that? He wasn't
serious so we didn't do anything about it. He
also testified in August of 1978 that there was in
fact a contract executed to sell the building. He
learned of a contract from a third party.
Let's go beyond that. And if I were going to
steal a piece of paper from Ed Gillis' office and
this is the piece I'm going to steal, but I didn't
steal a paper Richard didn't. But here's the
paper, August 29th of 1978, Ed Gillis writes down
the name of the people and phone numbers of the
people he's in contact with: "Donald Zucker",
"Irving Alter of Dreyer & Traub", "Ralph Galasso"
was another attorney, "RMC." And he testified he
did call Roy Cohn, he did report to Roy Cohn what
Zucker was thinking and doing with the building
and when Roy Cohn wasn't there, he didn't leave a
message for Jim Peck or anybody else, he left a
message with Vincent Millard, Mr. Cohn's personal
secretary or Christine, the switchboard operator
for Roy to call him. And when it comes to Big
Gym, he writes down Big Gym with a number to call.
And who's at Big Gym at this period of time?
Who's down there running things at Big Gym?
Russell Eldridge.
Whether it was by plan, whether it was for
$200,000 or not, sometime in December of 1979
Saxe, Bacon & Bolan threw Richard to the dogs in
terms of letting him be evicted after they knew
Richard possessed a valuable asset, openly trad-
able on the market.
As a matter of fact, Gillis openly testified to a
man named Pochcoff who had the contract and part
of the terms of that contract were vacancy, that
the seller could walk away with the contract from
Zucker, if it wasn't vacant. I believe the figure
of $200,000 clearly appears -- may appear to a
reasonable mind that the figure $200,000 refers to
the evaluation of the vacancy of the building.
You looked at it before.
But in any event, no question about it. The most
valuable asset to Big Gym in addition to the cash
aspect to the immediate problems were the fact
that he was there and he was in everybody's way by
being there. A clever lawyer can make money out
of that situation. Hopefully for a client.
But then again, is Roy Cohn a clever lawyer?
(WHEREUPON, there was a side bar discussion.)
THE COURT: Members of the jury, we're going to take a five minute
break, do not discuss the case five minutes.
(WHEREUPON, the jury leaves the jury box and exits
the courtroom.)
THE COURT: I think the record should disclose the fact that this
interruption was in request of Mr. Klotz.
MR. KLOTZ: Absolutely, your Honor.
THE COURT: Upon consent from the District Attorney.
MR. WILSON: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: It was not at the initiative of anyone but Mr. Klotz.
Five minutes.
(WHEREUPON, the court stands in recess.)
AFTER RECESS
(The defendant, his attorney, the Assistant Dis-
trict Attorneys are all present in court.)
THE COURT: Bring the jury in.
(WHEREUPON, the jury enters the courtroom and
fills the jury box.)
THE CLERK: Your Honor, this is the matter of the People of the
State of New York and Richard Dupont.
The defendant, his counsel and the Assistant District Attorney
and all sworn jurors are present.
THE COURT: You may resume, Mr. Klotz
MR. KLOTZ: (Continuing) The past, they say, is prologue. I'm
hoping that our prologue exceeds in duration the main
event. Let's proceed from the prologue to the main
event.
Count One of the indictment, The Grand Jury of the
Country of New York accuses -- as the judge says,
it's a piece of paper, it's the context with what
you're here for -- and accuse the defendant of the
attempt to commit the crime of coercion in the
First Degree.
The judge will talk to you about coercion and an
attempt to commit coercion in the Second Degree.
As written, it's First Degree; you have the right
to find a lesser included offense under the right
circumstances.
It alleges that Cohn was employed as an attorney
at the law firm of Saxe, Bacon & Bolan until
approximately February of 1979. That's the alle-
gation, the defendant was legally represented by
Saxe, Bacon & Bolan and that in or about February
of 1979, that's the allegation, Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan, P.C. terminated legal representation of
the defendant. Whereupon the defendant attempted
to compel and induce Roy Cohn to engage in conduct
which the later had a legal right to abstain from
to wit, representing the defendant by means of
attempting to instill in Roy Cohn the fear that if
the command was not met, the defendant would cause
damage to the property of Saxe, Bacon & Bolan.
That's the allegation, by conduct calculated
intended to adversely and affect the business
relationships of Saxe, Bacon & Bolan and its
clients, business and banking affiliates. That's
the charge of Count One.
As a matter of fact, the judge will instruct you
on the lesser included offense another offense,
attempt to commit the crime of coercion in the
Second Degree except that the threat is not to
damage the property at Saxe, Bacon & Bolan, but
would be to expose a secret or to embarrass some-
body or to act in a way calculated to harm another
for no good purpose or without benefit to the
person making the threat.
The judge will instruct you on the element accord-
ing to law and this is only for defense analysis.
But the key factors are:
Termination: the allegation is that in or about
February of '79 there was a termination of repre-
sentation.
Threat, that Dupont threatened Cohn thereafter,
after February of '79 and said if you guys don't
take this case-- words to that effect -- if you
don't take this case back I'm going to destroy the
property of Saxe, Bacon & Bolan and I'm going to
do things that are going to hurt Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan's clients and banking affiliates.
There are two parts to the threat. First there's
the part which said you must do this or else. And
then there's the "or else," I will do so and so.
As to those elements, the burden of proof is on
the prosecution and they must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Without beating a dead horse, Cohn told you under
oath and he called Richard: "I told Richard we are
no longer going to represent you," (except as to
peripheral matters, or loose ends. I'll get to
that) and here's why: "You told Zucker you gave
him seventy-five thousand dollars." Bunk -- "you
told us you gave him seventy-five thousand dol-
lars." Bunk!!
We've been through that already. The only allega-
tion Saxe, Bacon & Bolan had in front of it in
terms of giving Zucker money or giving money was
the fifty- seven thousand dollars. What Dupont
had said is that I had seventy-five thousand
dollars to buy the building, but I let Zucker bid
in on his promise. He never said $75,000. Not
reflected in the legal papers. That's bunk.
"Didn't pay a dime's rent. You've been in the
building collecting memberships and you never paid
a dime's rent."
Bunk. Schwartz, the receiver, sued for rent. He
did not receive two years, three years of rent
when the court ordered the payment of use and
occupancy, it ordered ten thousand dollars when
there was fourteen hundred dollars a month due.
Never paid a dime's rent. Bunk!
Other things: "the Attorney General. My God, the
Attorney General had an order against you and
we've just discovered this."
Come on. They were representing Dupont in front
of the Attorney General. David Tackett reported
to Cohn before February of '78, before February of
'78 when he moved to Florida, David Tackett re-
ported to Cohn Dupont's legal problems. And now a
year later, "my God, Richard, we found out these
terrible things, you're an awful person. Gillis I
think was there in '76, the first time and we've
seen how Gillis reports to Cohn. That Richard
used other names was another thing given by Cohn.
Now, all this came in, if you may remember, after
Mr. Dupont's attorney stood up and withdrew an
objection to the conversation. Okay? And I
suppose you're paid to make a decision, some of
this essentially scandalous material, allegations
by Roy Cohn, things he didn't have first hand
knowledge of, I suppose we could have limited
carefully what Cohn said. But if we did that, I
wouldn't be able to stand here before you right
now and say bunk to everything he said and trust-
ing you to look at your responsibility to under-
stand this is what Cohn is spewing out on the
witness stand as to the reason that he allegedly
gave Richard Dupont for terminating the relation-
ship except that under oath he told the Grand Jury
that Richard had called him.
Is that a small point? In the context of a law
firm severing relationship? Who called who? Cohn
so explicit as to the contents of that conversa-
tion. After he heard me withdraw the objection
and knowing what I had done, I think he's a good
lawyer, no question about that, a good lawyer in
terms of cleverness and experience, he merely
spewed forward every piece of garbage he can think
of to get into this record and get before you.
Tough decision relying upon you to honor your oath
and understand that this is hearsay, these are
things he's repeating, these are reasons he's
giving.
Because knowing I was going to stand before you
now and say to you they're bunk, they're nonsense.
The telephone conversation did not take place at
all because when we go beyond Mr. Cohn's testimony
and we look at the pieces of paper again that are
in evidence, there is no way that Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan terminated their relationship, their lawyer-
client relationship with Mr. Dupont in February of
1979. And the Court will issue instructions as to
the law to be applied in this trial as to time of
termina tion, but it comes back to, do you believe
that Roy Cohn called as he swore to you, or even
was called by Richard as he swore to the Grand
Jury and spewed forth in a single neat compact
conversation this information most of which is
disputed by the physical evidence of the case.
Now, then did this conversation take place? I
referred to that before. One thing we do know, it
took place before April, if it took place. You
know, we're in existential void here, the conver-
sation is disputable certainly subject to reason-
able doubt. If it took place -- if it took place
-- it had to take place before April of 1979
because in April of 1979 Richard Dupont -- and he
freely admits this -- paid a visit to Roy Cohn at
the hospital with the wilted flowers. He had
given an expensive french desk, but apparently he
couldn't give anything but wilted flowers.
And Cohn testified, Cohn testified -- and again,
I hate to give credence to what Cohn testified to
by merely repeating it, -- but Cohn said that
Dupont said: "This is one time where you can't get
away from me, I want you to take the case back, b-
a-c-k, take the case back." Meaning that Cohn
testifying in September of 1981 is telling you
that in April of 1979 in the hospital Richard is
asking him to take the case back because in Febru-
ary of 1979 he had told Richard that Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan would not represent him anymore.
Physical facts; the indictment says February --
oh, by the way, you remember that Cohn testified
before the hospital visit to a whole series of
conversations which changed in their tenor from
oh, gee whiz, Roy, you don't really mean it to Roy
I'm getting upset with you. So the whole series
of conversations between this conversation --
between the alleged and we believe fictitious --
we maintain fictitious conversation.
Now, what's happening and what do the pieces of
paper show? February 20, 1979, Exhibit C in
evidence, a complaint is prepared, subscribed by
Saxe, Bacon & Bolan, P.C., you've already examined
this once, February 27th, 1979, Richard Dupont
appears at the offices of Saxe, Bacon & Bolan and
verifies that complaint. Verification is that
process by which a client swears to the truthful-
ness of what's contained in the complaint. Now
Cohn tells the Grand Jury at the time of the
conversation and this is -- we read it back to him
and there's a conflict here -- "that I talked to
him on the phone and I said that was it, Richard,
period and thereafter we did not represent him at
all or did not represent him." He told you be-
cause probably by this time it's been brought to
his attention, "oh, gee whiz, Roy, there's someth-
ing happening."
MR. WILSON: I object.
THE COURT: Sustained. Strike that.
MR. KLOTZ: (Continuing) He tells you about a year after he
testified for the Grand Jury, well, there were some
"loose ends." "What are the loose ends, Mr. Cohn?" I
asked him on Cross Examination. "I really don't recall
anything in particular." But the issue is: did Saxe,
Bacon & Bolan terminate?
The complaint; Richard Dupont and Dupont Estates,
Inc., vs. Donald Zucker and Donald Zucker, Inc.
Suing Zucker for among other things, and you can
read this yourselves, it's in evidence, $600,000
for storage charges; a million dollars for fraud
by Zucker and this complaint was prepared in the
latter part of February 1979. You can't get much
later than February 27th of 1979 and in fact,
since 1979 is not a leap year, you can't get but
one day later. This could not by any stretch of
the imagination possibly be considered clearing
up a loose end. Or to put the burden of proof
where it lies, it is certainly reasonable to
conclude or it is certainly reasonable to think
that termination did not occur in February because
that cause of action was verified February 27th.
Other things happened. Let's go to the hospital
visit. We go the wilted flower syndrome again.
Why does Cohn psychologically refuse to give
Richard credit where credit is due under any
circumstance? Remember we played the tape record-
ing? And Cohn was trying to say to Richard,
"Richard, you do these terrible things, some of
them are pretty funny like the time you came to
the hospital." Richard wasn't admitting anything.
Later on Cohn says, well, "Richard, that was very
funny when you came to the hospital but I don't
think this is funny" and Richard proceeds to deny
what he was talking about.
The first time we played that for Mr. Cohn,we
said, "Mr. Cohn, did you think the hospital visit
was funny?" He says "no, I thought it was
strange." The second time we played it he says
"I think it was funny." His testimony in front of
you was that the hospital visit was a terrible
traumatic experience and Paul Dano said "I don't
think this is funny" and threw Richard out and
whatever happened to the wilted flowers?
Pieces of paper; there's an order which we read
into the court, April of 1979, an order is entered
into the Dupont vs. Aaron Schwartz saying -- in
effect, Dupont show up for an examination before
trial or else. Served upon Saxe, Bacon & Bolan.
Important question; did Cohn schedule a meeting
with Richard after the hospital visit? If you
believe Roy Con's testimony on termination, no way
would Roy Cohn have consented to an appointment
with Richard Dupont after the hospital visit if
you believe Roy Cohn.
And then we have Patricia Livermore's testimony,
that snapshot of walking over to the townhouse
with Richard on that day knowing Roy Cohn for
thirteen, fourteen years years. No questions ever
asked about that on Cross Examination. But know-
ing Roy Cohn for thirteen or fourteen years and
hearing Roy Cohn say, "Richard, come up and see me
now." You not only have to believe Roy Cohn
beyond a reasonable doubt, you -- you have to hold
that that little lady up there, no shown interest,
no Cross Examination, is lying through her teeth.
I don't think that's reasonable and I don't think
that's fair.
But I have other pieces of paper; May 23, 1979,
Dupont verified an affidavit in opposition in the
action Richard Dupont and Dupont Estates vs.
Donald Zucker,. Here's the paper, Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan cover, from Saxe, Bacon & Bolan's files
notarized by John Lang, the president of Saxe,
Bacon & Bolan. They terminated beyond a reason-
able doubt?
Now, Richard did testify in June when he appeared
for a deposition he was asked to consent to a
change and he refused. Reason, conflict of inter-
est. Conflict? It's in the record, Stanley
Friedman was Roy Cohn's partner, Stanley Friedman
was a politician. Gillis testified to the filing
of plans by Zucker and knowledge of those plans.
Richard has testified that they told him there was
a conflict because of a variance. Which testimo-
ny, Dupont or Cohn, is verified by the pieces of
paper that are in evidence?
Let's come to the threat part of it. June 27 --
first of all, the threat. Cohn testified -- the
threats. And remember; if these threats do not
measure up the indictment, whether you find it was
nice of Richard to say this or not doesn't matter.
You have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
these threats are what's alleged in the indictment
because this is the only charge we have.
Threats: what happened? Cohn is testifying; "the
calls continued and I would hang up quickly as I
could. He'd get in a couple of sentences and say
around the middle of May, beginning of May [this
is when we have testimony from Livermore indicat-
ing that Dupont's testimony concerning a meeting
with Cohn was true] middle of May sentences would
get in, instead of pleading or asking me to take
back the case [Cohn is testifying] that in the
middle of May he had to take the case back,"
[that's before the execution of that document] "he
started becoming unpleasant. He would say if I
don't take this case back you and all of your
friends and clients are going to be sorry. Don't
fool around with me and people like me who bring
people down like you."
Is that the threat alleged in the indictment?
Shortly thereafter -- again we're doing it with a
very clever attorney who knows precisely what the
issues were. Cohn testifies further' he refers to
a date, the date they're referring to I believe
is the date of the telegram. What happened? Just
prior to that date I would say a matter of days --
excuse me one second please. He got a telephone
conversation from Dupont. "I just wanted you to
know I'm not kidding around. You take that case
and if you don't I have got money completed for a
book, I'm going to say all sorts of things about
you, you'll never be able to walk around New York,
you and your friends are going to be destroyed, it
has cartoons and pictures and he hung up."
What did he say? Just prior to that date I would
say -- you recollection governs -- a matter of
days, I would say prior to June of 1979, the other
threat. So Cohn is saying that before June of
1979, before Dupont appeared at the deposition,
that threat was made. Again, is that threat
alleged in the indictment? If it's not, the
verdict, no matter how much you think Mr. Dupont
is guilty of things you don't like, might be
harassing, might be a lesser included offense of
threatening to expose Roy Cohn to ridicule or
something of that sort, but it is not to destroy
property.
And the other point is not only is it not the
threat, it is still before termination has oc-
curred. And until termination has occurred, he
may have been nasty, he might not have been nice.
He may have been very upset, but he is not commit-
ting the crime in the first count which we are
talking about.
Then comes what is by every reasonable standard an
insane telegram on June 26, 1979 -- June 22, 1979.
It is in evidence as Exhibit Three and it is sure
some telegram. That telegram spoke about a book
referred to Roy and their relationship as partn-
ers, describes some pretty bold obscene cartoons
and says that a lot of people are going to be
interested in it and you're going to be embar-
rassed. Again, is it a threat, in it's terms to
property? Has termination yet occurred? Because
until you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
legal episode legal representation had terminat-
ed, then the threats however nasty, however har-
assing they may even be, are not coercion, the
First count. Or they could even perhaps be the
lesser included offense; revealing secrets and
embarrassment. But destroying property beyond a
reasonable doubt, the threat I will destroy your
property beyond a reasonable doubt.
Now, quickly, that's where this testimony about
threats on Cohn's part seems to end, your recol-
lection governs.
On his opening statement, as I recall, Mr. Wilson
had made some references to David Tackett and the
information David Tackett may or may not have
conveyed to Cohn about threats. Please don't
confuse what attorneys say in opening or summa-
tions with evidence. I'm sure Mr. Wilson will say
that to you too.
Tackett never testified having told Cohn threaten-
ing things attributed to Mr. Dupont. He never
told Cohn, according to testimony now of Cohn and
Tackett, he never said to Cohn if you don't help
Richard Dupont, Richard Dupont has told me he will
destroy you. That's not in Tackett's testimony
and it's not even in Cohn's testimony. That
governs whether a threat occurred at that point
and by now we're in the Fall of 1979 and it's
really irrelevant whether termination has yet
occurred because we are so far beyond that clean
crisp detailed conversation of February 1979 where
Cohn maintains he terminated. I think the facts
say it's got to be a lie. We're so far beyond
that, that whatever happened thereafter is really
irrelevant to the first count of coercion.
MR. WILSON: I object, you Honor. That is not the case, anything
after the fall of '79 is irrelevant.
MR. KLOTZ: I withdraw the phrase irrelevant. That in terms of an
act of termination you have to listen to the Court's
instructions. But the indictment says February of
'79.
To recapitulate; Cohn either lied to the Grand
Jury or to you when he told the Grand Jury there
was no pending matters and when he told you there
were loose ends. In fact, he lied to both of you
because those loose ends were a major lawsuit
against Donald Zucker for over a million dollars,
there's no reasonable way that's a loose end.
He saw Richard in the hospital and he admitted in
a taped conversation that was a humorous visit, he
told you it was some kind of gruesome ordeal.
Richard said there was an appointment scheduled
thereafter. Miss Livermore, not cross examined,
Miss Livermore verified Richard went to the town-
house to see Cohn sometime after April and that's
that.
COUNT TWO, the Grand Jury accuses Richard Dupont
of burglary in the Third Degree in that on May
27th he entered or remained unlawfully in the
office of Rangely Realty located at 60 East 42nd
street with intent to commit the crime of petit
larceny. Two crucial elements; an unlawful entry,
and intent at the time of entry to commit a crime
of petit larceny. Unless you find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Dupont had formed the intention
to steal when he entered, then I believe --
MR. WILSON: I object.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. KLOTZ: (Continuing) Listen carefully --
THE COURT: The Court will instruct you on the law, not the
attorneys.
MR. KLOTZ: (Continuing) But listen, intent at the time of entry
beyond a reasonable doubt is one of the two principal
issues. You must find that intent beyond a reasonable
doubt. If you don't find intent beyond a reasonable
doubt at the time the Court instructs you, he's not
guilty.
Dupont testified I went there to look at some
files. We already know Gillis was his partner in
terms of 644 Greenwich Street or Gillis was on
that contract for 10%. Whether you find that an
attempt to look at the files was a nice thing or
not, it's not an intent to steal and you must
find that at the time, crucial time as instructed
by the Court, he had formed that intent.
The other aspect is entry. Now granted we're not
talking about taking a crowbar and busting down
the door, that's not necessary, would be wrong for
me to tell you it was necessary and certainly
would get an immediate objection because the
question is really beyond a reasonable doubt the
nature of those premises.
Was this a place closed to the public or wasn't
it? Beyond a reasonable doubt. Treadway testi-
fied the door was open, always open, never saw the
doors close. There was a public hallway between
the two offices occupied by Rangely Realty.
MR. WILSON: Objection.
THE COURT: This is a question of fact, the jury will rely upon
it's recollection and if that which is communicated to
you by the attorneys conforms with you recollection,
fine, if not, rely upon you own. If you have any doubt
upon these items, you can call upon the Court to have
the same read back to you.
MR. KLOTZ: (Continuing) There is a representation of the corridor
EXHIBIT FOURTEEN. There are two offices of Rangely
Realty; an office, on EXHIBIT FOURTEEN, labeled Bob
Treadway, and an office labeled Gillis' office. One
small point is that this, the corridor, which these
offices both open on to was not, accord ing to Gillis'
testimony, I believe, and your recollection does con-
trol, property rented by Rangely Realty Company. It
was property belonged to the overall suite. And as a
mater of fact, access to the xerox room from other
people would be through that hallway, at least in part.
Look at the diagram yourself, if you wish.
Rangely Realty's name and Ed Gillis' name were on
the directory of the building. And in the file
and marked in evidence is certainly the address of
Rangely Realty on their letter head, anybody can
go and look on the board and see where Rangely
Realty was, there was a receptionist to direct
people to Rangely Realty, the room was 1705. Mr.
Gillis testified that as a matter of fact people
did on occasion stop by without appointments. And
this is a business. This is a real estate busi-
ness, they circulate flyers, offering statements,
are circulated, they're in the file with their
address on it.
There's also a lesser included offense in that
charge of trespass in the Third Degree. If you
find that he didn't have a right to enter, but he
had the intent -- excuse me. If you find that he
didn't have the intent to commit a burglary but he
didn't have the right to enter you could find
guilty of a lesser included offense.
Now, Treadway's testimony on the burglary charge
and Dupont's testimony. First of all, Dupont in
one of the statements in evidence, Exhibit 12b,
had given a statement to the District Attorney,
that when he came up to the receptionist -- ques-
tion was asked by Mr. Wilson, page 48 "Were you or
were you not asked whether you had an
appointment?" and Dupont, with a statement in
evidence now, "I was not asked whether or not I
had an appointment." "Were you asked whether you
were expected?" "I was not asked whether I was
expected nor I don't remember exactly, no, but I
don't think I was." Wilson, "I see. And you were
escorted into Mr. Gillis' office by this individu-
al?
Answer: "No, I was not escorted."
That's in keeping with Treadway's testimony by the
way, because Treadway testified he had no advance
knowledge of Richard coming until he as actually
in the office.
Now we originally had this -- again, reference to
the EXHIBIT in court, Rangely Realty -- had this
little difference of whether Richard had one foot
in or one foot out, coffee in, briefcase out, or
whatever, but Treadway pretty clearly established
and Dupont when he thought about it pretty clearly
testified that he entered and introduced himself
as Mr. Richard, but he entered before he intro-
duced himself. He had to, couldn't stand in the
doorway with one foot out an one foot in. He
walked inside. The door was open.
You would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that he had no right to do that. The Court will
instruct you.
Third Count; what happens inside? Treadway in his
original testimony when he ran off the whole long
thing testified "this guy Richards called, asked
about Zucker, I went in I got the file I saw
Zucker's name on a piece of paper," (that being
this yellow piece of paper by the way identified
by Mr. Treadway I believe) and told him there
wasn't anything there. I left the file on my
desk. Richards appeared without appointment. I
went and got that file, brought it back. He asked
me for another file, 39 East 68th Street, -- this
was the original testimony -- I went and pulled
that file out, I thumbed through, I saw two pieces
of fancy stationery attached to something that
said "Friedman-Roth Realty Corp."
He identified this piece of paper, EXHIBIT 16E as
what is attached to the fancy stationary. An
empty Saxe, Bacon & Bolan envelope also being in
the file. Friedman and Roth paper in the 39 East
68th Street file, the townhouse, concerns 644
Greenwich Street. He stated after he had given
this to Dupont he thumbed through it and noticed
that from the 39 East 68th Street file, the fancy
paper was missing and he sat there and talked to
Dupont for a half hour or some period of time
after that.
He also testified to a third trip. On cross exami-
nation bringing to his attention various other
statements, he changed his story. And it wasn't
three distinct trips; I got both files at once.
He gets both files at once, the whole thing crum-
bles. This is a case of circumstantial evidence.
He did not see Dupont remove those papers. You
have to establish first on Treadway's testimony
that beyond a reasonable doubt Treadway saw those
papers in there. And you want to know who told us
that in no way could Treadway have seen those
papers in there, the 39 East 68th Street file? Ed
Gillis. Ed Gillis testified that in no way was
there -- was the Friedman and Roth paper in this
file. Your recollection will govern. Pretty
clear that's what Gillis testified to.
Circumstantial evidence. Gillis then testified to
a whole slew of other papers that he said should
have been in the file and missing, papers in,
papers out. One paper in the 39 East 68th Street,
Fred Hill, this yellow piece of paper, he had no
idea how it got in the file, doesn't know where it
came from, without total speculation shouldn't
have been in the file. Other papers in the file,
someone must have put it in there, trying to put
it on Richard.
But the clear conflict is that the very papers
that Treadway tried to claim or indicate through
circumstantial evidence that Richard stole, are
papers which Gillis testified that were not in
that file. And he went through a whole litany of
other papers that should have been in there that
were not testified to by Treadway, and Treadway's
confession - - everybody likes to debate with
attorneys -- "well, things get misfiled." You
have to find beyond a reasonable doubt, you have
to resolve the Treadway and Gillis total conflict.
Richard mentioned in direct examination that he
saw a paper or something where Dry Dock Savings
Bank, he knew something about Dry Dock Savings
Bank and there's no paper in here about a Dry
Dock Savings Bank. He said that a year ago, the
very time he had said he didn't steal anything.
Gillis testified the first time he knew about his
is when Richard called him and he called Treadway
and Treadway came to his office. Treadway testi-
fied he called Gillis. All of a sudden those
little things about who makes what calls becomes
important. Circumstantial evidence; other expla-
nations, not eliminated by the proof.
Fourth the telephone count. Did Richard Dupont
attempt to steal money? Now, that's the charge.
The charge is not that he billed the calls, that
by billing the calls or whoever billed the calls
-- that by billing the calls, Richard attempted to
steal cash. In other words, the person who had
made the calls without authority.
Ellen McGrath testified. First of all, she didn't
testify to any lack of authority on anybody's part
your recollection is going to govern on that. But
she testified that she took a portion of the
bills, talked to John Lang, made a mark, unex-
plained, told the Telephone Company, every marked
call we denied. No, she questioned them, but they
didn't want to pay them. Every marked call.
She also testified that some of those calls were
from a number which we know is Howard Pfeffer's
number. Some of those marked calls were from
Dupont's number. No distinction between Pfeffer
and Dupont in her testimony, None. We know that
Saxe, Bacon & Bolan didn't pay for any of those
calls for whatever reason. No distinction was
made between Pfeffer and Dupont.
Richard said on numerous occasions, said Pfeffer.
Tackett testified making calls from Richard's
apartment, that Pfeffer and Tackett made those
calls. Pfeffer now comes all the way from Los
Vegas, Nevada to tell us he never made any calls,
calls which Saxe, Bacon & Bolan had not yet paid
for. But that he had authority, even though Saxe,
Bacon & Bolan hasn't paid for those calls. His
authority comes form Roy Kulchak -- because he was
a para legal.
To find Richard guilty of this count on Howard
Pfeffer's testimony, you're going to find him
guilty because of the lack of authority for those
calls were made by him. He committed the primary
mistake of paying of paying for them. What other
distinction is there between Pfeffer and Dupont
except that Dupont paid for the calls made on his
own phone and Pfeffer's statement he had authori-
ty. No one from Saxe, Bacon & Bolan testified to
lack of authority. Miss McGrath only testified as
to questioning certain calls including Pfeffer's
calls with the telephone company and asking where
they were from. If there was a difference between
Pfeffer and Dupont, it's not shown by anything
Saxe, Bacon & Bolan did in this record.
The Sixth Count, harassment, of Ellen McGrath. I
don't want to kill that count. I can see it's
getting late, but there is no question that Ellen
McGrath and Richard had a relationship of some
kind. Not an intimate relationship, but a
friendly rela tionship. That Richard had met
Ellen McGrath. By the way, interesting point,
Richard met Ellen Mcgrath after Ellen McGrath came
to work at Saxe, Bacon & Bolan in the Spring of
1979, well after February of '79, she was in the
building with John Lang when John Lang notarized
this May 27th affidavit.
I skipped the fifth count, it's June Osbourne.
Dupont admits talking to June Osbourne, admitted
it to Mr. Wilson over a year ago. Miss Osbourne
is there to receive complaints. He called to pass
on information to her. By her own testimony, it
was passed on to the people under whose respon-
sibility that type of investigation would be
conducted. No one else from Manufacturers Hanover
testified as to those calls.
We are only left with Dupont making -- presenting
information to the person who was charged with
taking information and that's aggravated harass-
ment. And he specifically told us he did use a
different name and he told her please don't tell
Saxe, Bacon & Bolan about this complaint. He
wanted anonymity. I don't think a desire for
anonymity on that date is harassment. The fact is
that the content of the call is precisely what
Mrs. Osbourne was there to hear and then to pass
on to the appropriate investigative authority.
Seventh Count. Now the Seventh count and the
Tenth Count involved the Greenwich Police. Dupont
denies making the call. You are the arbiter of
fact in that case. I think the fact that the
caller spelled the name Cohn is now leaped upon as
a very important factor in the case of that tele-
phone call. I guess it's a little like being
polite. Someone spelled out the name, that means
it was Richard. I don't think that everybody who
spells out the name on a telephone call is Richard
Dupont and I don't think that everybody who was
polite on the telephone was Richard Dupont. The
only person who identified that voice on the phone
was Roy Cohn.
Eighth Count, Now East. Now we played a little
game with Now East. All this great testimony
about the cover and telephone calls. If there
ever was any proof that Richard Dupont was not the
initiator of Now East in any way, substantial way,
any criminal way, it's this note on Exhibit 43,
"enclosed payment for the first month we'll be in
contact Monday, Howard." And there has been
identified as Exhibit T2 in evidence, Dupont's
handwriting, no contrary exemplars were demanded
or taken or are before you and the note on the
cover is not Richard's handwriting on the evidence
before you.
Somebody else arranged that service and Mrs. Mayo
never attempted to identify Richard's voice. And
the connection is supposed to be that phone call
to Peter Manso. But I would suggest to you that
Manso had told other people of his interest,
including the man who was one of Roy Cohn's em-
ployees, of his interest in obtaining Now East.
The public notice concerning Studio 54, Mrs.
Pelletier, that's another count. Mrs. Pelletier --
again, are we going to convict Richard Dupont
because someone else was polite on the telephone?
She couldn't identify his voice.
Tenth Count, that's a restatement under another
theory of the call to the Greenwich Police Depart-
ment.
The Eleventh Count, that Dupont knew that Pfeffer
was going to testify at a Grand Jury hearing and
tampering with him essentially.
First of all, there is no evidence of, other than,
the most circumstantial kind, as to Dupont knowing
Pfeffer was going to testify at the Grand Jury.
Pfeffer never said that when he testified. He
said I called up Dupont and asked who was this
Wilson guy and I got a long spiel. Dupont told me
if I went to New York, I, because of the phone
calls -- they would arrest me and try to sweat it
out of me.
By the way, when it comes to tampering, whether
you believe that or not, who was the person who
talked Pfeffer out of going? Did you hear what he
said? His wife. You can check it out in the
transcript if you want. "After I talked to
Richard, I talked to my wife," (said she didn't
say Wilson's crazy or Cohn is crazy,) she said
"Richard's crazy don't get involved." That was
Pfeffer's testimony. Your recollection governs
but I'm pretty sure about that. You can check if
your recollection's different, if you want to.
I may be going a little overboard in telling you
to check this or check that. The judge will tell
you it's a rather complex process and really
truly, with exception to the written documents,
your recollection governs everything, everything
of what the evidence -- of what the testimony was.
Now we come to that last count. The last count is
simple harassment, it's different from the aggra-
vated harassment and it simply says that from
February '79 -- February of 1979 until October
29th, 1980 with intent to harass, annoy, alarm
another person Dupont engaged in acts which caused
-- engaged in a course of conduct and repeatedly
committed acts which alarm and seriously annoyed
such other person, Roy M. Cohn, with no legitimate
purpose.
The allegation is with no legitimate purpose.
It's like a Chinese menu -- almost or a multiple
choice question. The last count of the indict-
ment. You go through the indictment, check all of
the above. Every action thus far in the counts
are included, I guess, the Court will instruct
you. But all of the above. These he's admitted,
those he's denied.
Other testimony included oh, the Western Union--
the Ford Motor thing, Richard's supposed to have
originated the slogan "Roy Cohn can lick anyone".
There may be double entendre to that. That's
also the man Roy Cohn, the legal executioner.
Other counts in the indictment are poured into
this. The Telephone calls to Russell Herd, I
guess, that's included. Again, Cohn eavesdropped
on a telephone conversation where I guess Richard
said --I can't recall the testimony in detail --
watch out for Roy Cohn. May be good advice from
Richard's viewpoint.
The public notice which is Pelletier, another
public notice involving an auction and I want you
to look at that public auction notice, Saxe, Bacon
& Bolan's name isn't on that public notice, just
Studio 54. Again Pelletier's testimony, she
didn't even take that ad and somehow they're
trying to drag it in. She just had a conversation
which she thinks may have been about it. Remember
her testimony, a whole different situation. But
that's in there.
By the way, going, back to the alarm, let's talk
about the Greenwich Police Department one more
time because it's also a part of what we're talk-
ing about, harassment. Cohn testified that he was
having a dinner party, that night.
Set the scene. Dinner Party including some asso-
ciates of people who may be close. They're at the
dinner party and suddenly the phone rings. All
right. Now the telephone company meters time on
phone calls. Kevin McCarthy goes to the phone,
picks up the phone, the meter is ticking. Cohn
then says that McCarthy motioned me to pick up an
extension, the meter is still ticking through all
of that and a conversation ensued between Richard
and McCarthy which Cohn overheard. McCarthy never
came in to testify, by the way.
MR. WILSON: I object.
MR. KLOTZ: I have a right to comment on that.
THE COURT: I think you do too. Objection overruled.
MR. WILSON: I would ask the Court to instruct both parties have
equal opportunities to bring in witnesses.
MR. KLOTZ: (continuing) I would point out he's an employee of Roy
Cohn.
THE COURT: Is or isn't?
MR. KLOTZ: Is your Honor.
THE COURT: He's also available to both sides.
MR. KLOTZ: Yes
THE COURT: Let me just mop this up here. A party had no obliga-
tion to bring someone in unless he can testify as to
some key aspect of the case If one has other witnesses
or other evidence to that effect, there's no obligation
to that cumulative evidence. No inferences can be
drawn there upon. You needn't bring in everyone.
Continue please.
MR. KLOTZ: (Continuing) The only person who testified to that
phone call is, again, Roy Cohn, testified to a conver-
sation. Now, the bill shows that that phone call
lasted only one minute -- no , strike that. Dupont
admitted calling that night to Greenwich, to Cohn's
house asking for somebody and then when that person
wasn't there hanging up, not an extended conversation.
The bill shows the call lasted a minute or less. Every
phone call appears as at least a minute on the bill,
but it means up to a minute. I would suggest that
that's one circumstance that may indicate that mr.
Cohn's testimony is a fantasy in that regard.
Now we come to distribution of Now East which is
also included in an earlier count. How many
people testified to seeing Richard Dupont distrib-
ute Now East? One, just one. The only testimony
of Richard Dupont handing out Now East is from Roy
Cohn.
Richard Dupont testified and has stated over and
over that he delivered Now East to members of the
media.
Maybe that brings us to the nub of the problem.
Many acts alleged on Richard's part, he admits
openly and frankly doing certain things like
calling June Osbourne. He talked to Ellen Mc-
Grath, there is no question about that. He went
to the birthday party when it was opened to the
public late in the evening. Every act which is
included in the thirteenth -- twelfth count, the
last count, to be a criminal must be found beyond
a reasonable doubt to have no legitimate purpose.
But there are other actions of Richard that cer-
tainly annoy and harass Roy Cohn that were in this
case and mentioned to you that are not a part of
the prosecution's case and when it comes to dis-
cussing legitimate purpose, of the things Richard
did that are a part of the prosecution case, but
are before you in evidence, are nearly, if not
more, important than the things that are. Twice
-- well, three times -- but two times particularly
stuck in my mind when Roy Cohn really blew up
during Cross Examination.
First time or one of the times I asked him if he
had seen Richard Dupont at the Rubell-Schraeger
sentencing, Studio 54 sentencing, and he first
said no. Then I asked him whether he had seen a
gentlemen named Joseph Wershba, an executive
producer of CBS, 60 Minutes, and he said yes and
then he began to say I think I may have seen
Richard. Memory refreshed. Then I asked him if
at that date January 18, 1980, three days before
the public notice appeared in the New York Times
--before that time -- had he told Richard "Now
you've really done it this time." And Cohn al-
lowed as he might have said that, and Richard
testified he did say it. No denial of him saying
that.
Cohn also admitted -- oh, then he blew. He blew
because I said to him why would you say that.
What had he really done and he said because "It
was ghoulish for Richard to have come to the
Rubell-Schraeger sentencing," or words to that
effect. That Richard, you know, he was upset with
Richard -- it was a "ghoulish" thing, he was a
"ghoul" to have done some thing like that. There
were two or three hundred people in the courtroom.
But the one picked out to be the ghoul was Richard
Dupont.
Then I asked him another question. "Are you aware
that Richard spoke to the special prosecutor who
was involved in that case." The special prosecu-
tor's involvement in that case is a part of that
record in that there was an attempt to demonstrate
and this is why there was a special prosecutor,
that presidential aide, Hamilton Jordan had been
using cocaine at Studio 54. I asked Roy if he --
did he know that Dupont spoke to the special
prosecutor. Yes, Arthur Christy told me personal-
ly that he had been there. That's from Cohn.
Then Richard Dupont testified I think it's amply
clear, that he had been called down to see Chris-
ty. That's not a part of the case being presented
to you for criminal conduct.
Second time he blew, second time he blew. We're
listening to the tape recording conversation and
a chance reference was made to someone named Susan
Grennig and who Susan Grennig is we'll go into a
little more detail. I said is that the Susan
Grennig who worked at the parking lots in Chicago?
And he blew again and said "no, no, no," and he
said it a little more forcibly than I said it
right now, I don't want to be carried out of here.
He said "no, no, no, you got it all wrong. Oh, I
know what you're getting at. Susan didn't work at
the parking lot in chicago, she worked at the
hotel in Chicago. Russell worked at the parking
lots in Chicago. At least he did until you client
called the railroad and repeated his lies. They
gave us 48 hours to get out."
Why no allegation? Doesn't that fit this indict-
ment. Isn't it beautiful? Richard Dupont called
Chicago, told them lies and Dano and Cohn and
Russell are thrown out of Chicago. Oh, boy,
that's a beautiful one. That's harassment, boy,
but that's not in front of you.
A perfect case. They brought Pfeffer from Nevada
to testify. The fact about Chicago shouldn't be a
hard thing. And Richard told them this over a
year ago in his conversation. I got them out of
Chicago, I called the railroad and told them they
were double billing and they got kicked out.
That's not charged. Beyond a reasonable doubt on
the last count you must find there was no legiti-
mate purpose.
Richard testified to other harassing acts that
have not been put in front of you. He talked to
the Daily News and gave them a story which was
converted into part of a four part feature of the
Daily News.
The Philadelphia Bulletin, my recollection is that
in the opening statement, Mr. Wilson may have made
some reference to a telegram in the Philadelphia
Bulletin, but it wasn't proven, wasn't presented
to you as part of the prosecution's case.
Who told you about the Philadelphia Bulletin? The
defendant told you about the Philadelphia Bulletin
and Pfeffer admitted, told you on Cross Examina-
tion, that the story about the mess at Universal
Money Order was put in public by Richard Dupont by
calling the Philadelphia Bulletin and putting the
story in the Philadelphia Bulletin. Pfeffer
testified it was an accurate story.
Chicago; Dano was there through his company; Susan
Grennig. Susan Grennig! Do you remember how many
times her name came in and out of it. Susan
Grennig who we first meet picking up Richard's
records for Saxe, Bacon & Bolan in connection with
Richard's representation against Donald Zucker,
that's the first time we meet Susan Grennig. We
met her another time. I'm talking about chrono-
logical time, not in terms of testimony. She was
Ed Gillis's girl Friday before Treadway got the
job and before she moved to Chicago. Now she's
back at Margo's.
Russell the hairdresser; Big Gym; Chicago, Mar-
go's. All the time close to Dano, living much of
the time in Cohn's townhouse.
Gillis, when he testified, had met the evening
before at Margo's with Roy Cohn and scouts honor
under oath: "We never talked about my testimony."
Do you believe that? Do you really believe that
Roy Cohn , an experienced competent litigator,
criminal lawyer, competent defense of criminal
cases would have sat down with Ed Gillis the night
before his testimony at Margo's and not talk about
what Ed Gillis was going to say in court the next
day on a case Mr. Cohn obviously seemed to be
some what interested in?
And even poor Peter Manso. Maybe with Mr. Manso's
attitude toward defense counsel, I shouldn't say
poor Peter Manso. The man was hired by Playboy
magazine to do a feature story on Roy Cohn. Took
their money for expenses, spent much of his time
talking to Roy Cohn in Greenwich and Provincetown
and other nice places, submitted a story which
Playboy rejected, but then was picked up by Pent-
house.
I guess that's a big success story. Since that
time or during that time he dines with Roy Cohn,
meets Ed Gillis and Russell and the whole gang at
Provincetown on holidays and he was invited by Roy
Cohn personally to the opening of Margo's.
Hail, hail, the gang's all here.
A national figure. Roy Cohn is a national figure
who boasts of his image, "don't mess with Roy
cohn, the legal executioner." Dupont did and
that's why we're here.
You may find some of the things Richard said hard
to believe. You don't have to believe everything
he said. And I think based upon the documents in
this case you have to believe, on his say so, very
little of what he said. And even if you don't
believe him, that doesn't necessarily prove any-
thing. The burden of proof is on the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
Richard said he paid thousands of dollars and Cohn
denied that he paid it. Richard said that Cohn
knew about this, all these facts from the very
beginning, but Cohn denied it.
Tackett, Dano to a certain extent, confirmed it,
his own people. Russell was there, fully report-
ed. Richard said Cohn was involved as my partner,
Cohn denied it. But the contract, the money was
paid.
Molin's testimony. Richard said no order to show
cause. they didn't even give him time to move
out. There was no order to show cause. Cohn said
terminated, we terminated in February an upon that
rock the First Count is founded and if you find
reasonable grounds not to believe that termination
in February, the first count sinks like a rock.
MR. WILSON: I object.
THE COURT: Sustained. I'll give you the law on that. You'll
take it from me and no one else.
MR. KLOTZ: (continuing) Don't mess with Roy Cohn, the legal
executioner. Are we here because of Now East? Balo-
ney. We're here because Richard had the temerity to
ignore that warning and mess with Roy Cohn. We're here
because it's been demonstrated that Richard Dupont
somehow had divulged sources of infor mation at the
hear of Roy cohn's empire of cash businesses. Richard
Dupont publicly revealed the cheating of Pfeffer and
Skowron, not Pfeffer. So Pfeffer is here testifying
against Dupont. You must find in the last count no
legitimate purpose.
You saw Roy Cohn testify, you saw that face, star
of the magazine covers.
I suggest to you that when you looked at that
face, you were looking at the face of very real
evil. Evil can be charming. I mean if evil
always came in a disgusting giuse it would easy to
recognize, it wouldn't be a much of a threat,
would it?
Evil can be witty, nothing saying that evil people
are dumb. Evil can be cool, particularly when it
marshals itself when it's vital interests are at
stake. The face of evil can be quick and sharp,
and can be smarter than any lawyer Richard Dupont
can get.
But the face of evil is a face of evil.
This isn't just Richard Dupont's journey to the
brink of eternity, it's yours. Everyone of the
participants of this trial are in one way or
another under oath. Mr. Wilson, the judge, and
myself.
MR. WILSON: I object.
MR. KLOTZ: It's not a plea for authority, your Honor.
THE COURT: I don't know if I know what that means.
MR. KLOTZ: Your Honor, I'm just trying to say this is a very
serious moment for all us us.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. KLOTZ: (Continuing) All of us have taken an oath of office
which is our obligation to fulfill and you have taken
an oath. Yes, you've got to convict Richard Dupont if
you are satisfied, each of you individually satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that Roy Cohn, the legal
executioner, testified truthfully.
His worst enemy sits before you, whatever his
sins, they've got to be measured solely against
that indictment. Reasonable doubt about the story
told by Cohn. What does reasonable doubt mean to
you? The Court will instruct you, but in the final
analysis reasonable doubt is your province.
This is as sacred moment for you as much this
vulgar and profane society we live in can make any
moment sacred. The oath makes it sacred. A man
cannot be convicted of a crime except by a verdict
from a jury of his peers. You are his peers.
How you Honor that oath is something that you will
have to live with.
We've all done our best to present the facts to
you. I believe that if you honor your oath, that
if you weigh whether the prosecution has met is
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the
facts of the indictment, you will find there is
reasonable doubt and that you will return a ver-
dict of not guilty to each and every count or will
certainly weigh carefully the gravity of each and
every count, particularly the first and second
counts.
This is Richard's moment.
This is your moment.
My moment is over.
THE COURT: Members of the jury, take a five minute recess. Do
not discuss the case please.
(WHEREUPON, the jury leaves the jury box and exits the
courtroom.)
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