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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X : 73 Civ 2665 (CHT) INDEX FUND, INC., : : Plaintiff, : : -against- : : ROBERT HAGOPIAN et al, : : Defendants. : : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X ARMSTRONG DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO EXCLUDE IN LIMINE CERTAIN EVIDENCE Introduction. This memorandum is submitted in support of the motion by defendants Armstrong Capital, S.A. ("Armstrong Capital") and Armstrong Investors, S. A. ("Armstrong Investors") (collectively the "Armstrong defendants" or the "Armstrong Fund") for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's amended complaint. As alternative relief, the Armstrong defendants seek partial summary judgment striking certain allegations in the amended complaint and to exclude in limine evidence on certain irrelevant, collateral or otherwise improper points. This alternative relief parallels the relief requested by defendants Citibank, N.A. ("Citibank") and Citirust (Bahamas) Limited ("Cititrust") in a concurrent motion dated April 10, 1987 and returnable April 24, 1987. The issues are identical and rather than duplicate the thorough presentation of the Citibank papers, the Armstrong defendants would simply refer the court to the presentation of those issues in the moving papers of Citibank and Cititrust. For purposes of this memorandum, those papers will be cited as "CITI". Statement of the case. The facts which support the Armstrong defendants' motion are not in dispute and may be drawn from either the allegations of the amended complaint or the Undisputed Facts ("U.F.") which appear as Part III of the JOINT PRE-TRIAL ORDER herein (CITI, Ex. 7). Among the relevant material facts about which there is no genuine issue to be tried are these: Defendants John P. Galanis ("Galanis") and Akiyoshi Yamada ("Yamada") organized the Armstrong Fund (the Armstrong defendants collectively) to induce foreign investors to invest money in the Armstrong Fund and thereafter to defraud the Armstrong Fund and its shareholders by depleting the assets of the Armstrong Fund and using such assets for their own benefit (U.F., par. 46). Defendants Galanis and Yamada, through defendant Everest Management Company, invested monies of the Armstrong Fund for their own personal gain in securities that were worthless and overpriced. In so doing, defendants Galanis and Yamada violated their contractual and fiduciary duties to the Armstrong Fund, as well as the provisions of the Exchange Act, the Securities Act, the Investment Company Act and common law principles of fraud with respect to the Armstrong Fund. As a result of the activities of Defendants Galanis and Yamada, virtually all the funds of Armstrong Capital were dissipated (U.F., par. 47). Plaintiff's contention is that Galanis and Yamada bribed Hagopian to participate in their conspiracy and cause plaintiff to purchase share of various issuers which were subject to the manipulation (JOINT PRE-TRIAL ORDER, PART IV, SUBPART A, Factual Position of Plaintiff, CITI Ex. 7, p. 15). The first challenged purchase by plaintiff occurred on June 16, 1970, the last on September 25, 1970 (Amended Complaint, par. 21(h), CITI, Ex. 2). There was no fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and the Armstrong defendants (U.F., par. 19, 20 and 21). None of the conspirators were an officer, employee or director of either of the Armstrong defendants. The plaintiffs have not alleged, and there is no evidence of, any wrongdoing on the part of any officer or employee of either of the Armstrong defendants (U.F., par. 22). On the other hand, Hagopian was not only the principal of plaintiff's investment advisor, but from November 4, 1969 to September 16, 1970, he was an officer and director of the plaintiff itself (U.F., par. 15). Nearly six months prior to the disputed transaction, as early as January 28, 1970, plaintiff's Board of Directors learned of a pending SEC proceeding against Hagopian with respect to his activities as an employee of Winfield Growth Fund, Inc. (U.F. paras. 11, 12). They took no action to remove him or curb his authority. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT (1) All of the primary acts for which liability is complained are the acts of defendant John P. Galanis ("Galanis"), the principal of defendant Armstrong Capital's investment advisor, Robert R. Hagopian ("Hagopian"), an officer and director of plaintiff as well as the principal of plaintiff's investment advisor and their co-conspirators; (2) No wrongdoing has been alleged on the part of any officer, employee or even director of either of the Armstrong defendants; (3) The Armstrong defendants were a victim of the misconduct alleged in the amended complaint and realized no profit from it; (4) The application of the principles of "aider and abettor" liability, respondent superior and pari delicto as set forth in this Court's opinion of February 6, 1985 prevents the recovery of damages by the Index Fund from the Armstrong defendants (CITI, Ex. 1, cited hereafter as "1985 decision"). POINT ONE THE FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF GALANIS MAY NOT BE IMPUTED TO THE ARMSTRONG DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. There is no evidence that any officer or employee of the Armstrong defendants committed any culpable act in the course of the alleged misconduct or possessed any guilty knowledge. Therefore, under common law, liability for the culpable acts of the Armstrong's alleged agent Galanis and his co-conspirators can only attach to the Armstrong defendants vicariously pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. The relationship between a mutual fund and its management is unique. "This management structure contrasts sharply with that of a typical corporation. In the usual corporate situation, the interests of management and shareholders are identical on most matters. Since the officers who run the corporation are paid directly by the corpora- tion and usually have a substantial equity investment in it, they devote themselves to profit maximization and thus act in the best interests of both the corpora- tion and themselves. Control of the mutual fund how- ever, lies largely in the hands of the investment advisor, an external business entity whose primary interest is undeniably the maximization of its own profit. "While the management and shareholders of a mutual fund have certain parallel interests * * * there are important areas in which there interests may conflict. (Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d. Cir. 1977) It its 1985 decision, this Court rejected an argument that Hagopian's alleged knowledge that the securities it purchased were overpriced should be imputed to plaintiff. "If an agent's interests are adverse to the principal, therefore, that knowledge will not be imputed to the principal." (CITI, Ex. 1, p. 16; see also Mallis v. Bankers Trust, 717 F.2d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1983); Hartford Accounting & Indemnity Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 225-226 (1967). But the same reasoning applies with even greater force to the relationship of Galanis to the Armstrong defendants. Hagopian was both an officer and director of plaintiff. Galanis held neither position with either Armstrong defendant. From the inception of the Armstrong Fund, his motive was corrupt and at total divergence with the interests of both Armstrong Investors and Armstrong Capital. The literally undisputed facts are: Defendants John P. Galanis ("Galanis") and Akiyoshi Yamada ("Yamada") organized the Armstrong Fund (the Armstrong defendants collectively) to induce foreign investors to invest money in the Armstrong Fund and thereafter to defraud the Armstrong Fund and its shareholders by depleting the assets of the Armstrong Fund and using such assets for their own benefit (U.F., par. 46). Defendants Galanis and Yamada, through defendant Everest Management Company, invested monies of the Armstrong Fund for their own personal gain in securi- ties that were worthless and overpriced. In so doing, defendants Galanis and Yamada violated their contrac- tual and fiduciary duties to the Armstrong Fund, as well as the provisions of the Exchange Act, the Securi- ties Act, the Investment Company Act and common law principles of fraud with respect to the Armstrong Fund. As a result of the activities of Defendants Galanis and Yamada, virtually all the funds of Armstrong Capital were dissipated (U.F., par. 47). This court, having absolved plaintiff of culpability for Hagopian's actions, can not then impute culpability for the actions of Galanis to the Armstrong defendants. POINT TWO THERE IS NO BASIS FOR HOLDING EITHER OF THE ARMSTRONG DEFENDANTS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS AN AIDER AND ABETTOR. In the 1985 decision (CITI, Ex. 1, pg. 12), this Court set forth three elements to establish aider and abettor liability: (1) there must have been a violation of the securities laws by a primary party, and (2) the defendant must have had actual knowledge of the violation, or the defendant must have had a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff and have acted recklessly, and (3) the defendant rendered substantial assistance to the principal actor in effecting the primary violation. In so far as this motion for summary judgment is concerned, the Armstrong defendants submit that there is no evidence establishing the existence of the second element. The undisputed facts establish no officer or employee of the Armstrong defendants had any knowledge of the alleged primary violations of Galanis and his co-conspirators. In is undisputed that there was no fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and the Armstrong defendants (U.F., par. 19, 20 and 21). For the same reasons this Court has refused to impute Hagopian's knowledge to the plaintiff, the knowledge of Galanis can not be imputed to the Armstrong defendants (POINT ONE, supra). Because the second required element is lacking, no aider and abettor liability can be imposed upon the Armstrong defendants. POINT THREE THE ARMSTRONG DEFENDANTS AND PLAINTIFF ARE EITHER EQUALLY CULPABLE OR BOTH NOT CULPABLE AT ALL. In the 1985 decision, the Court declined to apply the doctrine of pari delicto in order to absolve Citibank and Cititrust of liability to the plaintiff. One of the cases cited by the Court was Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1321-24 (9th Cir. 1984). That decision has now been affirmed by the Supreme Court and while the court did not apply the doctrine to the matter before it, it did set forth the criteria by which the doctrine might bar a private action for damages pursuant to the securities laws: "* * * Accordingly, a private action for damages in these circumstances may be barred only where (1) as a direct result of his own actions plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress and (2) preclusion of the suit would not significantly interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and the protection of the investing public." Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310-311 (1985). As noted in POINT ONE, supra, the culpability of plaintiff and the Armstrong defendants is "at least" equal. In fact, given the position of Hagopian as an officer and director of plaintiff, arguably, the plaintiff is substantially more cul pable than the Armstrong defendants. Application of the doctrine under the circumstances of this case would not interfere with enforcement of the securities laws. A plethora of unquestionable culpable defendants have been identified. Galanis and Yamada are clearly liable and some judgments have already been entered. On the other hand, to award .opone defrauded mutual fund judgment against another defrauded mutual fund would do violence to the object of the securities laws which is to award -- not punish -- victims of security frauds. If on these facts, the Armstrong defendants are culpable, then so too is plaintiff and this becomes one of the rare cases where on the undisputed facts the doctrine of pari delicto must be applied. The Court need not reach that result, however. Under the authority of its own 1985 decision, as discussed in POINTS ONE and TWO, the Armstrong defendants are not culpable at all. CONCLUSION Because of the egregious fraud perpetrated on the Armstrong defendants by Galanis and his co-conspirators, the Armstrong defendants are not vicariously liable for his fraudulent acts. Because the Armstrong defendants had no knowledge of the fraud alleged and no fiduciary obligation to the plaintiff, they can not be held liable to plaintiff as aiders and abettors. The Armstrong defendants and plaintiff are either equally culpable, or not culpable at all. Dated: New York, New York April 13, 1987 Respectfully submitted, JOHN C. KLOTZ Attorney for Armstrong Defendants 217 Broadway, Suite 407 New York, New York 10007 (212) 308-1162
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